

~~Personnel~~  
*Security*

1 April 1981

DD/S&amp;T 1448-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate of Science and Technology

VIA: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
Chief, Analysis Group, FBISFROM: 

STAT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentations

1. I request approval to present orally the attached discussion outlines, one on political events in Beijing since December last year and another on skills and background from my own educational experience that I have found to be valuable for service as a government foreign affairs analyst.

2. When approved, I intend to give the oral presentations on 9 April at a faculty seminar and a careers forum at Pennsylvania State University.

3. None of the material presented in the discussion outlines is, to my knowledge, classified.

4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an Agency employee but will append the standard disclaimer indicating that the views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the Agency.

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Attachment:  
As stated

I have reviewed the attached texts and, to the best of my knowledge, have found them to be unclassified.

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✓ Director, FBIS*2 Apr 81*  
Date

I have reviewed the attached texts and, to the best of my knowledge, have found them to be unclassified and approve them for presentation orally.

STAT

  
Executive Officer  
Directorate of Science and Technology

6 APR 1981

Date



SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentations

Distribution:

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TALK TO PENN STATE FACULTY/GRADUATE STUDENTS SEMINAR, 9 April 1981

O U T L I N E

The Beijing Leadership's December Revolution

- Through most of 1980 Deng Xiaoping seemed unmistakably to be gaining ground toward goals he had long pressed:
  - °16 Jan speech (Hong Kong CHENG MING): keynote for year's reforms
  - °Feb 80 Fifth CCP Plenum: party reforms (restoration of Secretariat, preparation for rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi in April, propagation of Guiding Principles and draft constitution as beginning of rectification drive; call for convening of 12th CCP Congress ahead of schedule to deal with outstanding issues). Most decidedly and onesidely Dengist of plenums.
  - °Sep 80 5th NPC 3rd session: state reform: Zhao replaces Hua in surge of reformist rhetoric, etc.
  - °Opening of Beijing trials of Cultural Revolution cliques
  - °Progress toward unseating of Hua Guofeng as CCP Chairman amid press signs critical of Hua, calls for abolition of lifetime tenure, feudal succession.
  - °Hong Kong press, Beijing press signs of anticipated plenum to prepare way for 12th party congress early in 1981.
- At year's end, however, no plenum in sight despite convocation of central work conference in mid-December; Hua Guofeng's status remains unclear with peculiar public appearance record; variety of media indications suggest anomalously that Hua, and not Deng, has gathered momentum. Why?
- Key issue in turnaround was clearly economic: while a highlevel leadership meeting in late November (Hong Kong press, Beijing press) probably received Hua Guofeng's resignation, at same time it appears to have discussed the national economic situation assessment emerging was overwhelmingly pessimistic:
  - °2 Dec People's Daily editorial
  - °1 Jan People's Daily editorial
  - °1 Jan Hu Yaobang acknowledgment that Central Work Conference discussed economy, not historical/political issues.
- To understand political significance of this new assessment, must review debate over economic policy over past year:
  - °April-June discussions of readjustment, capital construction curtailment, pace and scope of reform.
  - °NPC session as hightude of economic reform, based on optimistic appraisal of economy by Deng, Yao Yilin in particular (XINHUA quotes).
  - °Early November indications of more pessimistic appraisal in press.

December evaluation of economy negatively, with consequent emphasis on recentralization of economy and postponement of reforms seems a setback for Deng.

--This conclusion is strengthened by appearance of political and social themes in press which are unmistakably not Dengist; but associated with Hua:

- °Hua speech to PLA conference late April: material incentives, political-ideological work, spiritual civilization; miezi xingwu slogan.

- °Dengist counterattack: emphasize spiritual incentives, belittle ideological-political work; feudalism, not bourgeois ideology as main danger; materialist definition of spiritual civilization theme (Hu Yaobang speech).

Current Dec-Jan commentary has reversed Deng's counterattack:

- °Stresses ideological-political work in currently constrained economic situation..

- °Restores legitimacy of voluntarist slogans and models (fearing neither death nor hardship, foolish old man, seizing turtles deep down)

- °Launching of nationwide campaigns to promote communist morality and spiritual civilization (1 January People's Daily editorial slap at Hu Yaobang): morality codes (Human in particular); Lei Feng as current model in PLA and out.

--Impetus for these themes is, again clearly economic and out of concern for anticipated social consequences of economic retrenchment: unemployment, etc.

- +Also apparent concern over implications of Polish situation for parallel conditions in China: TU policy reversal most telling in this regard: Oct-Nov press encourages more activist TU policy; Jan People's Daily editorial explicitly warns against efforts to throw off party control/supervision of trade unions.

--Turnaround in economic policy has had other political consequences: the big slowdown in party rectification, again in a manner favorable to party moderates rather than Deng group: 3-yr. pattern of divergence over issue main danger is party left vs. main danger = society right, as relates to "lingering fear" and "crisis of confidence."

--Most ominous consequence, however, has been apparent reopening of leadership debate over PRC foreign policy orientation:

- °Recap argument on April 79 opening to USSR and impact of subsequent domestic developments on its demise.

- °Questions over Deng's reformist program's failure raises questions about wisdom of foreign policy program; this seems all the more to have gained impetus from uncertainties of U.S. China policy and obvious sensitivity on Beijing.

°What are the indications: +8 Jan People's Daily article on  
Zhou Enlai  
+Jan RED FLAG article on advance and  
retreat  
+4 Feb Workers Daily article on  
Wang Jiaxiang  
+10 Feb Guangming Daily article on  
Zuo Zongtang

--What are the implications of all of this?

- °Beijing leadership is going through a period of extensive disarray; Deng Xiaoping, far from having situation in hand, has lost initiative that he had over previous year and a half, has suffered setbacks politically, and there appear to be few signs that he has yet reasserted himself.
- °Chen Yun clearly has come to fore; role of mediator between Deng reform group and Hua/Ye moderate group all the more clear; certainly running the economic show; political/social policies depending on assessment of economic situation seem strongly to favor moderate group, for time being at least.
- °Potential for significant modification in PRC foreign policy; but unclear as yet how great.
- °Convocation of party plenum will signal resolution of current conflicts; how addresses current questions will provide immediate answers to questions currently ambiguous.

TALK AT CAREERS FORUM, PENN STATE, 9 APRIL 1981

O U T L I N E

- Worked for nearly 7 years at FBIS as a Chinese affairs analyst; am formally described as a "propaganda analyst": specifically attempt to learn as much as can be learned about the motivations, substance and results of Chinese foreign and domestic policies and about Chinese domestic politics from China's open media: its newspapers, radio broadcasts, journals and magazines.
- This process of intensive, systematic scrutiny of China's open media has over the years frequently provided highly accurate judgments about the foreign policy and domestic politics of a country that has been and continues to be among the most closed societies in the world.
- The process of gleaning information about Chinese politics from China's open media, variously called "China-watching" or "Pekingology"--its counterpart with respect to the Soviet Union is called "Kremlinology"--has frequently been compared to other sexy, mysterious arcane arts like astrology, reading oracle bones or tea leaves, etc. Actually it is a painstaking laborious process of meticulous scrutiny of statements in the Chinese press resting on two fundamental assumptions:
  - °Everything in the Chinese media is controlled;
  - °Everything that appears in the Chinese media therefore is there for a reason.Since nothing appears in Beijing's press except for some purpose, that purpose or intention can be inferred from the way the media treat the issue; the reasons may often be mundane or commonplace, but often they are not. The art of China-watching thus draws on the very same assumptions and principles that the Chinese use in operating their controlled media. Examples: atmospherics used by XINHUA in talks between Chinese leaders with visitors from foreign countries: North Korea/Romania/France/USSR.
- The process of building accurate judgments about Chinese politics and Chinese foreign policy thus is a laborious process of careful comparison of media treatment of similar events or topics over broad periods of time. It is frequently frustrating, often tedious, but it is sometimes spectacularly successful at illuminating the intentions and policies of a very secretive political system, and it exemplifies the best efforts of the government's analytical community. Success at this kind of work requires:
  - °The capacity to scan large bodies of frequently diverse information from China's media and to retain sometimes minute but sometimes extremely revealing--when juxtaposed alongside other minutiae.

°Ability to arrive at accurate judgments about frequently ongoing events on basis of often fragmentary or ambiguous bits of information; opportunity to take longrange perspective on various issues and problems does exist, but frequently it does not seem relevant to the attempt to understand the cold realities of everyday events in China on a day-to-day basis.

--Analysts naturally are successful at this effort in varying degrees, and in my opinion, the following abilities and skills--all procurable at your local university--are most important:

°Language: No skill has proven to be more decisive in attempting to understand a society's ongoing political affairs than the ability to understand a society's language & read its press accurately in original.

°Historical perspective: Not to slight the insights provided by the theoretical models and comparative procedures of political "science," nothing can compensate for ignorance of a country's past, its political traditions and history and the evolution of its social, economic and cultural institutions and concepts. If you're interested in a communist country like China, then a thorough background in the history of Marxism and with the history of the Soviet Union is also indispensable.

°The ability to write concisely and rapidly: Most policymakers who might read what a government analyst writes do not have the time or interest in reading a 30-page analysis of China's latest leadership crisis; most of the time most analysts do not have time to prepare papers of that length; they do, nevertheless have to do the research that might go into such a paper and then compress it into a page or two of clear, well-reasoned expository prose.